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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

E. L. PACK & ASSOCIATES,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

: BRIEF OF APPELLEE

vs.

:

THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,

: Case No. 920479-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

: Argument Priority (b)(15)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Cabinet Shoppe (hereinafter "Cabinet Shoppe")
believes that the correct jurisdictional subparagraph conferring
jurisdiction on this court to hear this appeal is not 78-2a3(2)(h) Utah Code, "appeals from the orders on petitions for
extraordinary writs. . . . but is 78-2a-3(2)(d) Utah Code,
"appeals from the circuit courts. . . . "
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The central issiie here is whether there exists in the

record any evidence to support the trial court's findings of
fact, viewing all such evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court.
Standard of Review:

"To mount a successful attack on the

trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshall all
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then
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demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to
the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings."

Scharf v. BMG Corp. 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah, 1985).

As to certain specific findings of fact, the issue may be
stated as follows, the standard of review being the same:
a.

Whether there is evidence in the record to support

the finding of the trial court that appellant E. L. Pack
(hereinafter sometimes "Mr. Pack") failed to prove the
allegations of his complaint.
b.

Whether there is evidence in the record to support

the finding of the trial court that Mr. Pack's alleged damages
were both unproven and speculative.
c.

Whether there is evidence in the record to support

the finding of the trial court that even under Mr. Pack's theory
of the case he refused to cooperate so that his demands could be
met.
d.

Whether there is evidence is the record to support

the finding of the trial court that the Cabinet Shopppe contract,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, superceded the E. L. Pack contract,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, particularly with respect to direct
conflicts in contractual language.
e.

Whether there is evidence in the record to support

the finding of the trial court that the writing of "takes
exception" by Mr. Pack next to certain terms in the Cabinet
Shoppe contract did not eliminate those terms from the agreement
2

between the parties.
f.

Whether there is evidence in the record to support

the trial court's award of attorney's fees where both parties, by
stipulation, submitted affidavits as to attorney's fees.
2.

A second issue argued by Mr. Pack is whether it was

within the discretion of the trial court to permit Mrs. Luanda
Lewis to testify after being present during Mr. Pack's case in
chief.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion with clear or
manifest prejudice.

5A C. J. S. 112, Appeal _& Error, Section

1610.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below
The Cabinet Shoppe accepts E. L. Pack's statement of the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and disposition in
the court below.
Statement of Facts
Appellant has presented to the court a detailed statement of
evidence, most of which the trial court did not find persuasive,
and much of which is inconsistent with the trial court's
findings.

The Cabinet Shoppe here presents certain evidence
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which the trial court did find persuasive and which does support
the trial court's findings:
1. Mr. Pack claimed that he didn't use low bidders on
any phase of his Jeremy Ranch home and that he cut no corners in
its construction (Tr. 13). Yet he didn't accept the Cabinet
Shoppe's initial bid of just over $17,000.00 (Tr. 54). Mrs.
Lewis explained that she initially presented to Mr. Pack a bid of
just over $17,000.00 premised on "state of the art and many
extras" (Tr. 137), but Mr. Pack didn't want to pay that much so
she reworked her bid by eliminating glass doors and changing door
style (Tr. 138).
2.

For clarity, the first contract, Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1, is referred to hereafter as the "E. L. Pack contract."
The second contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, is referred to
hereafter as the "Cabinet Shoppe contract."
3.

The terms of the Cabinet Shoppe contract require payment

of the full contract price "upon pickup/delivery" (PI. Ex. 3).
This contract also provides that "any claim for adjustment shall
not be reason or cause for failure to make payment arising from
or under this contract. . . ." (Pi. Ex. 3 ) . Mr. Pack took no
exception to either of these terms, yet after delivery and
installation of the cabinets he still refused to pay the balance
due.
4.

The Cabinet Shoppe made extensive efforts to placate Mr.

Pack, so as to receive payment for work performed.
4

This work

included, in addition to the original work agreed:
a.

at no extra cost to Mr. Pack, the Cabinet Shoppe

built and installed a new custom range hood when the first hood
built according to Mr. Pack's own measurements did not fit (Def.
Ex. 6).
b.

at no extra cost to Mr. Pack, the Cabinet Shoppe

enclosed the letter slot cabinet as he wished (Ibid).
c.

at no extra cost to Mr. Pack, the Cabinet Shoppe

rebuilt the kitchen island so as to eliminate a drawer bank when
Mr. Pack changed his mind about what he wanted (Ibid).
d.

at no extra cost to Mr. Pack, the Cabinet Shoppe

made the dividers in the cabinet above the refrigerator removable
(Ibid).
e.

at no extra cost to Mr. Pack, the Cabinet Shoppe

trimmed the oak countertop with an oak backsplash (Ibid).
5.

Despite this work, Mr. Pack still refused to pay

according to the terms of the Cabinet Shoppe contract (Pi. Ex.
3).

The Cabinet Shoppe offered to satisfy the last of Mr. Pack's

objections, in exchange for his promise of payment of the balance
due (Def. Ex. 6). Mr. Pack called Mark Sellers and an
appointment was made for this purpose (Tr. 176). When the
Cabinet Shoppe arrived at the appointed time, Mr. Pack was not
even home (Tr. 176).
6.

After the cabinets were installed, Mr. Pack objected to
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the use of certain materials, i. e. PVC edging tape and furniture
buttons, despite the fact that the sample cabinet he had been
shown included these same materials as did the cabinets installed
in the Citation home he had visited (Tr. 155, 156, 160). Mrs.
Lewis testified that she had not seen two letters about these
materials until exhibits were exchanged prior to trial (Pi. Ex.
6, PI. Ex. 8, Tr. 149). Mark Sellers testified that he had been
building cabinets for fifteen years (Tr. 173) and that the
Cabinet Shoppe used only high standard quality materials (Tr.
187).
7.

Mr. Pack voiced objections to the size of certain

cabinets delivered, yet Mrs. Lewis testified that the size of the
cabinets was derived from plans Mr. Pack delivered to Mrs. Lewis
so that she could then prepare drawings which were presented to
and approved by Mr. Pack (Tr. 141-143).
8.

Mark Sellers testified that many other objections, i.

e., peeled edging, were in the nature of warranty work which
would have been handled as warranty work had Mr. Pack paid as the
contract between the parties required (Tr. 178-179).
9.

In all, Mr. Pack admitted that Mr. Sellers made fifteen

trips to his home (Tr. 73).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There was no material deficiency in the cabinetry.
Nevertheless, many of Mr. Pack's objections were satisfied and
the rest could have been satisfied had Mr. Pack cooperated.
6

The trial court expressly found (1) that Mr. Pack had not
proven the allegations of his complaint; (2) that Mr. Pack's
damage claims were unproven and speculative; (3) that even under
Mr. Pack's theory of the case he had refused to cooperate so as
to permit the work to be done; (4) that the Cabinet Shoppe
contract superceded the E. L. Pack contract, particularly with
respect to direct conflicts in contract language; (5) that "takes
exception" was too vague to eliminate the excepted terms from the
agreement between the parties; and (6) that an award of
attorney's fees consistent with counsel's affidavit would be
reasonable.

Each of this findings is supported by evidence in

the record and should not be disturbed on appeal.
Finally, it was within the discretion of the trial court to
permit Mrs. Lewis to testify after having been present during Mr.
Pack's case in chief and Mr. Pack has shown no clear or manifest
prejudice from the exercise of that discretion.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE WAS NO MATERIAL DEFICIENCY IN THE CABINETRY. NEVERTHELESS MANY OF MR. PACK'S OBJECTIONS WERE SATISFIED AND
THE REST COULD HAVE BEEN REMEDIED HAD MR. PACK COOPERATED.
A.

The trial court expressly found that Mr. Pack did
not prove the allegations of his complaint. That
finding should remain undisturbed on appeal.

E. L. Pack is a picky person.

Mark Sellers, with fifteeen

years experience in cabinetry, still had not satisfied him after
fifteen trips to Mr. Pack's home.
7

The record below shows extensive efforts, more than
legally required, to satisfy Mr. Pack.

The reality of the

relationship between the parties was that Mr. Pack repeatedly
manipulated the Cabinet Shoppe into satisfying his changing whims
and increasing demands by withholding payment.
The trial court correctly perceived this and would not
tolerate it.

It decreed that a debt is due and must be paid.

Now, Mr. Pack appeals.

This appeal is entirely consistent

with Mr. Pack's attitude, demeanor, and conduct at trial.
The numerous photos placed into evidence by Mr. Pack reveal,
more than anything else, cabinetry which would be a credit to any
home.
The legal question is not satisfaction of Mr. Pack's
mercurial fancies, but contract performance.

Technical or

unimportant defects do not defeat recovery, substantial
compliance with plans and specifications being sufficient:
11

[A] breach of the contract which will defeat
recovery cannot be based upon technical or unimportant
omissions or defects in the performance of either
party. Substantial compliance with plans and
specifications is sufficient.
"The nature of the inquiry as to what constitutes
substantial performance is exemplified in the area
of building and construction contracts. It is generally
deeemed that there is substantial performance of such
a contract where all the essentials necessary to the
full accomplishment of the purposes for which the thing
contracted for has been constructed are performed with
such an approximation to complete performance that the
owner obtains substantially what is called for by the
contract." 17A Am. Jur. 2d 644-645, Contracts,
Section 634.
8

There is no question but that all of the many cabinets,
manufactured at great time and expense by the Cabinet Shoppe, are
an impressive installation.

Mark Sellers testified that many of

Mr. Pack's little complaints were in the nature of warranty work
which would have been remedied if Mr. Pack had paid as agreed
(Tr. 178-180).

In detail at trial, both Mrs. Lewis and Mr.

Sellers responded to the rest of Mr. Pack's litany of complaints,
with the result that the trial court simply did not buy Mr.
Pack's story that there had been any breach of any obligation by
the Cabinet Shoppe.

The trial court specifically found that Mr.

Pack had not proven the allegations of his complaint (R. 77), and
that finding, as sacred as a jury verdict, cf. 5A C. J. S. 429,
Appeal S^ Error, Section 1656(1), cannot be second guessed and
should remain undisturbed on appeal.
B.

The trial court expressly found that Mr. Pack's
damage claims were unproven and speculative. That
finding should remain undisturbed on appeal.

The trial court expressly found all of Mr. Pack's claimed
damages to be unproven and "speculative" (R. 77), speculative
because there was no proof sufficient to the convince the trial
court that any item of alleged damage was in fact an item of
damage as opposed to an object of Mr. Pack's changing fancy, or
an item of warranty work, or an item which the Cabinet Shoppe
could have fixed if Mr. Pack had cooperated.

Despite his

appellate arguments to the contrary, Mr. Pack gets no offset
9

because none was found at trial.
C.

The trial court expressly found that even under Mr,
Pack's theory of the case he had refused to cooperate so
as to permit the work to be done. This finding should
remain undisturbed on appeal.

The core of Mr. Pack's complaint on appeal is that the Cabinet
Shoppe did not perform according to the terms of the E. L. Pack
contract and that the trial court erred in concluding that his
contract was superceded by the Cabinet Shoppe contract.

The

problem with this theory is that the trial court expressly found
that even if the trial court was wrong, and the Cabinet Shoppe
contract did not supercede the E. L. Pack contract, Mr. Pack
still did not have any remedy or any defense because he refused
to cooperate so as to permit the Cabinet Shoppe to do the work.
The trial court found that "even under the superceded terms of
the first contract, the Cabinet Shoppe offered to make the
corrections requested by Pack upon payment by Pack for the work,
but Pack did not cooperate so as to permit this to happen" (R.
76-77).
Evidence in the record supports this conclusion.

Mrs. Lewis

testified as to numerous changes in the work, at no extra cost to
Mr. Pack, in an effort to satisfy him (Def. Ex. 6). Mrs. Lewis
and Mark Sellers testified as to the type of cabinets, doors, and
materials used being the same as in the sample cabinet and in the
Citation home which Mr. Pack had visited (Tr. 155, 156, 160).
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Mr. Sellers testified that Mr. Pack called him and set up an
appointment to do the last work required to satisfy him, but Mr.
Pack was not even home (Tr. 176).
The rule is as follows:
"A party to a contract cannot take advantage of his own
act or omission to escape liability thereon. Consequently .
. . where a party causes or sanctions a breach, or nonperformance, he cannot recover damages for nonperformance or
interpose the breach as a defense to an action on the
contract." 17A C. J. S. p. 638-639, Contracts, Section
468(a)
And further:
"In every building and construction contract which
contains no express covenants on the subject, there are
implied covenants that the contractor shall be permitted,
without interference, to proceed with the construction of
the work in accordance with the terms of the contract,
that the party for whom the work is to be done will not
obstruct, hinder, or delay him, but will facilitate
performance of the work, and not increase the cost of
performance, and that he shall be given such possession
of the premises as will enable him adequately to carry
on and complete the work." Ibid, p. 643.
It is doubtful, given Mr. Pack's demeanor and attitude
regarding this matter, that he would ever have fully paid the
Cabinet Shoppe, regardless of what they had done.
Since the record supports the trial court's finding of noncooperation by Mr. Pack, the judgment below must be affirmed.
D.

There is evidence in the record to support the
conclusion of the trial court that the Cabinet
Shoppe contract superceded the E. L. Pack contract,
particularly with respect to direct conflicts in
contract language. This finding should remain
undisturbed on appeal.

In light of the trial court's finding that Mr. Pack did not
11

cooperate so as to permit his demands to be completed, the
question of whether the Cabinet Shoppe contract superceded the E.
L. Pack contract is of no significance.

There is, nevertheless,

evidence to support the trial court's disposition of that issue,
particularly with respect to whether Mr. Pack breached his
payment obligation to the Cabinet Shoppe.
Mr. Pack's agreement and the Cabinet Shoppe's agreement are
in direct conflict as to payment terms.

The E. L. Pack contract

calls for payment in full "within thirty days after completion
and final inspection by E. L. Pack."

(PI. Ex. 1). The Cabinet

Shoppe's agreement calls for payment "upon pickup/delivery" and
specifically provides that "any claim for adjustment shall not be
reason or cause for failure to make payment from or under this
contract. . . ." (PI. Ex. 3). Mr. Pack took no exception,
whatever that means, to either of these provisions.
The extrinsic evidence respecting both agreements is a note
from Mrs. Lewis to Mr. Pack which says, "Ed, I have gone over
your contract carefully & made notations that are applicable.
Please let me know if you have any questions.

I do need to have

my contract signed also" (Pi. Ex. 2). Mr. Pack signed Mrs.
Lewis' contract and, while he wrote "takes exception" to some
terms, he took no exception to payment terms.

In fact, he wrote

"ok" by the terms requiring payment upon delivery.

If "takes

exception" means "I don't agree" as Mr. Pack claims it does, then
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no "takes exception" and "ok" must mean "I do agree." Mr. Pack
therefore intended, by his own view of the case, to be bound by
the payment terms of the Cabinet Shoppe contract, which terms he
breached by failing to pay upon delivery and by withholding
payment during the dispute.
E.

There is evidence in the record to support the
finding of the trial court that the language
"takes exception" did not eliminate the excepted
terms from the contract between the parties. This
finding should remain undisturbed on appeal.

Again, the evidence respecting the signing of both contracts
is that Mrs. Lewis signed the E. L. Pack contract and then
reguested that the Cabinet Shoppe contract be signed also (Pi.
Ex. 2). Mr. Pack, on this reguest, signed the Cabinet Shoppe
contract.

On signing, rather than line out terms as the trial

court found he should have done, he merely wrote "takes
exception."

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the findings of the trial court, there is a strong inference that
Mr. Pack wrote "takes exception," rather than lining out terms,
because he did not want to insist on the elimination of those
terms in such a way that it would kill the sweet deal he had made
with respect to the cabinets.

Mr. Pack knew the Cabinet Shoppe

reguired his signature on that contract but he didn't know
whether his objections to terms would kill the deal, so he
employed the most diplomatic, and the most vague, term he could
think of, and wrote "takes exception" rather than lining out

13

those terms.
It is entirely consistent with the evidence and with the
trial court's findings to conclude, as the trial court did in
this case, that "takes exception" means "I don't like it" as
opposed to "I don't agree to it."
"A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is
to be determined by the trier of fact if it depends upon the
credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable
inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence."

Restatement of

the Law, Contracts 2d, Section 212(2), vol. 2, p. 125. Here, the
fact finder found that Mr. Pack had not acted in such a way as to
eliminate the excepted terms from the Cabinet Shoppe contract, in
light of all the circumstances.

That finding should not be

disturbed on appeal.
F.

There is evidence in the record to support the
court's award of attorney's fees. That finding
should not be disturbed on appeal.

Undersigned counsel for the Cabinet Shoppe views Mr. Pack's
argument respecting attorney's fees as a repudiation of a
stipulation made at trial.
In this case, prior to trial, counsel conversed as to the
manner of presenting attorney's fees, with the result that both
counsel for Mr. Pack and the Cabinet Shoppe submitted affidavits
as to attorney's fees and costs (Pi. Ex. 70; Def. Ex. 11).
Both affidavits are nearly identical in form.
14

Both itemize

time spent and work performed.

Both contain statements

respecting hourly rates, familiarity with community rates, and
both affirm the reasonableness of the fees charged.

Why

appellant would now claim that there is no evidence respecting
attorney's fees is beyond the comprehension of undersigned
counsel.
At trial, Mrs. Lewis affirmed her agreement and obligation
to pay attorney's fees (Tr. 159). Mr. Pack's counsel stated
respecting the Cabinet Shoppe's attorney's fee affidavit, "11 is
Mr. Robbins' attorney fee affidavit, we'd stipulate that this is
his affidavit as to time, rate and services rendered, not-we
would not stipulate that judgment ought to be entered against Mr.
Pack in that amount" (Tr. 195-196).
It is clear that the trial court accepted this as a
stipulation respecting the manner in which attorney's fees would
be proved, both sides employing the same method of proving
attorney's fees, i. e., by affidavit.

In its findings, the trial

court expressly found the "attorney's fees and costs set forth by
counsel for the Cabinet Shoppe to be in sufficient detail and
reasonable under the circumstances, and hereby awards attorney's
fees and costs of $2,947.00 to the Cabinet Shoppe" (R. 78).
The argument of Mr. Pack respecting attorney's fees should
not even be considered as made in good faith.
attorney's fees below should be affirmed.
15

The award of

II.

PERMITTING MRS. LEWIS TO TESTIFY AFTER HAVING BEEN PRESENT
DURING MR. PACK'S CASE IN CHIEF WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETION
OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Whether a witness present during testimony may testify after

the adverse party has moved for the exclusion of witnesses is a
matter within the discretion of the trial court:

"In the absence

of an abuse of in the exercise by the trial court of its
discretion in excluding witnesses, its ruling is conclusive."

5A

C. J. S. 112, Appeal and Error, Section 1610. And further,
"whether or not a witness who has disobeyed a rule of exclusion
or separation should be permitted to testify, is not subject
to review except in case of abuse." Ibid.
Moreover, to "justify review, such abuse has been required
to be clear, or manifest, and prejudice to the

party complaining

has also been required." Ibid.
Mr. Pack is not anywhere near this standard.

Mrs. Lewis

simply testified from her recollection as to what happened.
There is no suggestion in the record that her testimony was
fabricated in any way.

In fact, the trial court, by its findings

impliedly found the testimony of Mrs. Lewis to be more credible
than that of Mr. Pack.

Moreover, if the trial court had simply

declined to honor Mr. Pack's motion to exclude witnesses in the
first place, that decision would have been within his discretion
and not subject to review.

Ibid.

16

CONCLUSION
The findings, conclusion and judgment below should be
affirmed in all respects, provided that the Cabinet Shoppe
requests remand to the Circuit Court for an award of attorney's
fees incurred in defending this appeal. Management Services v.
Development Associates, 617 P. 2d 406 (Utah, 1980).
DATED this ffiV-day of April, 1993.
B
^""L. Edward Robbins
Attorney for Appellee/
The Cabinet Shoppe

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the £ 5

d

&y °f April, 1993, I

served the foregoing Brief of Appellee upon the following by hand
delivery of four copies thereof, one copy manually signed by
counsel, to the following address:
Stephen L. Henroid, Esq.
Clark R. Nielsen, Esq.
Sara Bendel Ryan, Esq.
Henroid, Henroid & Nielsen
185 South State Street
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

L. Edward Robbins
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L. Edward Robbins, ill66
Attorney for Defendant/
Counterclaimant
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Streetn
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-7030

JUN 29 1992
CbrktfSumaft Court*

&

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
E. L. PACK & ASSOCIATES,
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE
AND ORDER OF SALE

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,
Defendant/Counterclaimant
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
CAFFALL TILE & MARBLE, a Utah
corporation; CAFFALL TILE &
SUPPLY, INC. dba CAFFALL TILE
QUALITY LINE PRODUCTS, E. L.
PACK, JR.,

Civil No. 89-CV-45
Honorable Maurice N. Jones

Third-Party Defendants.
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in this matter, now makes and enters its
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DECREE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That there is due and owing to the defendant/

counterclaimant The Cabinet Shoppe Inc. (hereinafter "Cabinet
Shoppe11) from the plaintiff/count erdefendant E. L. Pack &
Associates and third party defendant E. L. Pack, Jr. (hereinafter
"Pack") the sum of $5,025.00, together with interest from and
after October 4, 1988 until paid at the rate of ten percent (10%)
per annum until entry of decree and twelve percent (12%) per
annum thereafter, together with attorney's fees and costs of
court of $2f947.00.

Pursuant to Rule 4-505(3), Rules of Judicial

Administration, this amount shall be augmented in the amount of
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit.
2.

That said sums are secured by a mechanic's lien recorded

December 16, 1988 as Entry #301604, Summit County recorder, and
constitute a lien on the following described real property:
Lot 41, Jeremy Ranch Plat #1, according to the
official records of the County Recorder of Summit
County, State of Utah
3.

That the secured premises shall be sold at public

auction in the manner prescribed by statute by the Sheriff of
Summit County, State of Utah.
4.

That said Sheriff, after the time allowed by law for
2
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redemption has expired, shall execute a deed to the purchaser or
purchasers at the sale, and if any of the parties to this action
who may be in possession of the premises, or any part thereof, or
any person who has come into posession since the commencement of
this action shall refuse to deliver possession of the premises,
or any part thereof, to such purchaser or purchasers on
production of the deed for the premises, or any part thereof, the
said purchaser shall be entitled to the issuance of a writ of
restitution, without further notice, to compel delivery of the
premises to the purchaser or purchasers.
5.

That the proceeds of the sale shall be applied as

follows, in the following order:
First, to the payment of the Sheriff's fees, costs of sale
and disbursements;
Second, to the payment to the plaintiff of the total suras
set forth in paragraph one above;
6.

That should the proceeds of sale be insufficient to pay

the sums above-described, then plaintiff may be entitled to a
deficiency judgment against Pack upon filing the proper
affidavits to support such a judgment.
7.

That Pack, and all persons claiming under them, after

the filing of the lis pendens, be and they are hereby forever
barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and equity of
3
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redemption in and to the secured premises and every part thereof,
from and after the date of the delivery of the deed of the Sheriff
of Summit County, State of Ut
DATED this 3- *? day of H^S^Otr^

^

BY THE CO

Approved a s t o form:

Stephen L.

flenroid
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, 1992.

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the

day of June, 1992, I

served the foregoing Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale upon
the following by hand delivery of a true and correct copy to his
offices at the following address:
Stephen L. Henroid
Henroid & Henroid
f*njfP

™ n - ™
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60 East QouLh Main Otirccfe //>T T.JTWT rpusB] V±rrcs**<g'£>w
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Attorneys f o r

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

L. Edward Robbins
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No.

P' L ED
m

L. Edward Robbins, if2166

Attorney for Defendant/
Counterclaimant
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Streetn
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-7030
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
E. L. PACK & ASSOCIATES,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

vs.
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,
Defendant/Counterclaimant
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
CAFFALL TILE & MARBLE, a Utah
corporation; CAFFALL TILE. &
SUPPLY, INC. dba CAFFALL TILE
QUALITY LINE PRODUCTS, E. L.
PACK, JR.,

Civil No. 89-CV-45
Honorable Maurice N. Jones

Third-Party Defendants.
This matter came on for trial on the 8th day of May,
1990 before this Court sitting without a jury, the Honorable
Maurice N. Jones presiding.

Following trial, the Court announced
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its findings and conlusions in open court and now enters its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Counsel for

defendant/counterclaimant has represented to the court that
following trial Gary and Lowanda Lewis, prinicpals in the Cabinet
Shoppe, filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding in California,
hence the delay in preparing formal Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

For simplicity, plaintiff/counterdefendant

E. L. Pack and Associates and Third Party Defendant E. L. Pack,
Jr. shall be referred to as "Pack" and defendant/counterclaimant
The Cabinet Shoppe, Inc. shall be referred to as "Cabinet
Shoppe."
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court finds that there are two contracts in this

case, one prepared and presented to the Cabinet Shoppe by Pack
(Trial Exhibit 1), and one prepared and presented to Pack by the
Cabinet Shoppe (Trial Exhibit 3). Both contracts were signed by
the parties.

The first contract consists of four typewritten

pages, the first page of which bears the caption "E. L. Pack &
Associates."

The second contract consists of one typewritten

page and bears the caption "Standard Form Agreement for Cabinets
and Installation."

Both contracts were signed by the parties.

2. The court further finds that the parties felt both
contracts were binding, however, there are conflicts between the
contracts which the court must decide.
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3.

The court finds that the second contract, by its terms,

supercedes the first contract and that as to any conflicting
provisions, the terms of the second contract control. The court
bases this finding on paragraph eight of the second contract,
wherein it is said that "This agreement sets forth the entire
transaction between the parties; any and all prior agreements,
made by either party are superseded by this agreement."
4.

The court further finds that although Pack wrote "takes

exception" to paragraph eight of the second contract, as well as
to other provisions of the second contract, that his so writing
was not a sufficient act to eliminate those provisions from the
agreement betweeen the parties.

The court finds that to

eliminate those provisions from the second contract, Pack should
have lined out those provisions*

The court finds that while the

language "takes exception" expresses displeasure with those
terms, it does not eliminate those provisions from the second
contract.
5.

The court further finds that although the Cabinet Shoppe

initially bid the job in question at $17,000.00, it finally
agreed to perform the job for $8,500.00, of which amount Pack
paid $3,500.00.
6.

There is also an issue as to contract performance. The

court finds that even under the superceded terms of the first

3
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contract, the Cabinet Shoppe offered to make the corrections
requested by Pack upon payment by Pack for the work, but that
Pack did not cooperate so as to permit this to happen.

The

second contract specifically requires payment to be made upon
delivery of the cabinets.

Pack took no exception to this term

and yet when the Cabinet Shoppe attempted to satisfy his
objections so as to receive payment, Pack afforded the Cabinet
Shoppe no opportunity to make repairs or adjustments.
7.

The court finds that Pack materially breached the second

contract by failing to pay for the cabinets and by failing to
allow the Cabinet Shoppe to make the corrections requested,
and that the Cabinet Shoppe had no reasonable opportunity under
the circumstances to make the corrections requested.
8.

Consistent with the foregoing findings, the court finds

against Pack as to the allegations of his complaint, no cause of
action being proven thereon, and all damages claimed thereby
being speculative.
9.

The court finds that Pack paid $3,500.00 of the

$8,500.00 contract price, leaving a debt owed to the Cabinet
Shoppe of $5,025.00 ($5,000.00 plus $25.00 late charge),
together with interest at the legal rate from and after October
4, 1988, the date of demand by Cabinet Shoppe, until paid.
10.

The court further finds that the Cabinet Shoppe is
4
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entitled to recover its attorney's fees and costs of court under
paragraph seven of the second agreement.

In this case, counsel

for the parties have submitted affidavits as to attorney's fees
and costs of court incurred.

The court finds the attorney's

fees and costs set forth by counsel for the Cabinet Shoppe to be
in sufficient detail and reasonable under the circumstances, and
hereby awards attorney's fees and costs of $2,947.00 to the
Cabinet Shoppe.
11.

At trial, the parties agreed that no technical

objection was made to the lien of the Cabinet Shoppe.

The court

having found in favor of the Cabinet Shoppe as to the debt in
question, also finds the lien of the Cabinet Shoppe on the
property in question duly enforceable according to law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That pursuant to the second contract between the

parties (Trial Exhibit 3>, Pack owes to the Cabinet Shoppe the
sum of $5,025.00, together with interest thereon from and after
October 4, 1988 until paid at ten percent (10%) per annum prior
to entry of decree and twelve percent (12%) per annum after entry
of decree, and attorney's fees and costs of $2,947.00.

Pursuant

to Rule 4-505(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, this amount
shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution
5
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or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit.
2.

That the Cabinet Shoppe is entitled to a decree of

foreclosure pursuant to its mechanic's lien duly recorded in the
offices of the Summit County Recorder as Entry #301604 on
December 16, 1988. That property is more particularly identified
as
Lot 41, Jeremy Ranch Plat #1, according to the
official records in the Office of the County
Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah.
3.

The foregoing premises are ordered sold at public

auction in the manner prescribed by statute by the Sheriff of
Summit County, State of Utah, pursuant to the order of this
court.
4.

That the proceeds of the sale should be applied in

accordance with the Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale to be
entered herein; that in the event that the proceeds of the sale
are insufficient to pay the sums owing to the Cabinet Shoppe,
that the Cabinet Shoppe should be awarded a deficiency judgment
against Pack for any sums remaining unpaid.
5.

That Pack and all persons claiming under them should be

forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and
estate in and to said premises, and, after the period of

6
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redemption expires, should be barred and foreclosed of all right
and equity of redemption therein and thereto.

DATED this Hcf

day of J/^V<*

BY THE

Approved as to form:

Stephen L. Henroid
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, 1992,

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the l££~ day of Junef 1992, I
served the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
upon the following by hand delivery of a true and correct copy to
his offices at the following address:
Stephen L. Henroid
Henroid & Henroid
Suite 700-3 8 Eagle Sate Tower60 Eact South Main Cfcreot ipTS.^fTC

/^r^
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

L. Edward Robbms
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Agreement
between
E.L.
Wyoming; hereby
referred
but not limited
to the

Pack
and The Cabinet
to
as contractor.
following.

Contractor
to
make necessary
owner may purchase
approximately
finish
doors,
molding,
trim,
lot
as
stain
used
on
all
contractors
actual
cost.
Color
All drawers
cabinets
of
finish.
Kitchen

and cabinets
in
wet
bar;
and

island

ifiEast side
overhang,
of upper
c&hter to
acceptable.

to be o£„rai3ed

Shoppe
Cabinets

Inc.,
to

Urie,
include

arrangements
with
stain
vendor
so
( 15
) gallons
of
stain
to
casing.
Stain
to be same blend
and
cabinets.
Owner
to
purchase
at
and mfg to be Watco, light
walnut.

kitchen;
bedroom
"panel

bathrooms;
drawers
#2 to
include
construction

and
lower
"Melamine"

on all

sides.

of lower stage
kitchen
cabinets,
that portion
under bar
to include
same raised
panel
look.
TnBH&PSZ'aets and ends
arid lower
stage-cabinets
in kitchen
and
entertainment
Fla
include
this
^raTised'panel
feature.
^
surfaces
not
% %
If questions
arise
consult
owner.
Vavl+te^ P/af
Sk/Z-frc*

H Contractor
to
provide
entertainment
center
with oak counter
top,
K- ">p except
wet bar area.
Hold lamination
joints
to
a minimum,
take
ttveert. e x t r a C3re
conflicting
grain flows
and
contrasting
t o eliminate
^ ^ ^ g r a y s and reds.
Add one
extra
coat
of lacquer
to his
counter
m
>^i ivc tOp0
Wine rack
to
be
of
criss
cross"
construction.
Do not
(( run*include
wine glass
holders
under upper stage
cabinets.
All
shelves
assemblies
knobs.

in
all
cabinets
to
include
drawer
handles

be
adjustable.
and
cabinet

Cabinets
above wet bar to
include
two
request
of owner, contractor
to provide
etched
glass
(owner furnished)
may be
Vine

rack

to hold

10 bottles

maximum with

All
handles

glass
doors
wet bar doors
installed.
open

shelf

cabinet
and or

each. Upon
to owner so
above

rack.

Wet bar finished
height
35 1/2 inches
tall.
Remaining
portion
of
entertainment
center
to be 33 1/2 inches
finished
height.
Please
manufacture
accordingly.
Wet bar sink area to cantilever
out
four
inches
as
shown.

Include custom oak hood over range.
Raised panel construction.
Owner to supply
contractor
with fan assembly. Contractor to
include mounting of fan and transition from fan outlet to exhaust
flu. Owner to wire in.

qf

Use highest quality hinges
equal. Consult Owner.

available.

European type

hinges or

Include oak valance over kitchen sink. Raised panel construction.
Kitchen sink to cantilever
out as shown on drawing. Valance to
cantilever
out to follow sink
cantilever.
Include light box over kitchen island. Raised panel construction.
Include crown mold and dental mold. Approximately 54" X 62*. Use
gold para-cube light
difuser.
Include oak light
and main bath.

frame and gold para-cube difuser in master bath

Laundry room cabinets

to include

crown mold and dental mold.

Contractor to provide
owner with cabinet
feet
dimensions and
position so plumbing can be completed to kitchen sink and both
toe"kick
heaters.
Kitchen cabinet and master bathroom cabinet
to have removable
bottom to access
toe kick
heater and make final connections.
Contractor to install
grills
for toe kick heaters.
Include two tip

outs in front

Basement vanity

to have off-set

of kitchen

sink.

so east door will

clear.

Bedroom 02 to include student
desk With two pencil drawers.
Include cabinet
above desk as shown on drawing. ^Allow space
between top of cabinet and ceiling.
All cabinets
Hold distance

to include oak kick plates.
between double cabinet

$£X1

doors to 4MM.

oA
&A11 drawer fronts to have rabbet
joints;
dowelled,
glued, ant
T>aa^«cAscrewed. All
drawers to have metal sides. Drawers supplied to b(
paowV ^
j
f
l
r contractors top of the line
style
and construction. Discus
sty
construction of drawers with owner.
dp Overlay fillers
to be
vP
doors on all
cabinets.
IOV
X
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u

double thick or same thickness

>MJi doors and drawers to be a minimum of 13/16 inch

as cabine
thick.

All drawer
fronts
to be one
solid
piece
of
over raised
panel
doors
that are
laminated,
grey streaks,
red streaks,
conflicting
grain
changed out by
contractor.

oak.
Carefully
look
^oors with
obvious
flows,
etc.,will
be

Stain
to
be
applied
evenly.
Over
staining
accepted.
Extra
care to
be taken
where raised
cabinet
doors
meet frame
portion.
Beveled
portion
of raised
panel
, ,

of cabinet
to eliminate

areas will not
panel portion

doors
to be milled
as smooth as
over staining
of beveled
areas.

Make maximum effort
to match
will not be
accepted.

grain

flows.

Knots

in any

be
of
face

cabinets

ft* + Two of
the
five
upper
stage
cabinet
assemblies
in
the
entertainment
center
to have
double
doors.
Upper stage
cabinet
*?
next to
wet bar
and upper stage
cabinet
next to east wall to be
Q*7 open with adjustable
shelves.
Stereo
speakers
(owner
furnished)
liV^s to be placed
in these
areas.
Those
out

cabinets
trays.

Lazy susan's
quality
Contractor
bottles,
employees.

to

the

supplied
available.

east
by

of

the

kitchen

contractor

island
shall

to have

be

of

two

the

to
remove all
shipping
cartons,
paper,
boxes,
lunch sacks,
etc.
brought
on
to
job
by him
Leave all installation
areas
clean and
swept.

roll
highest

or

cans,
his

Remaining
sanding
marks/
gouges/
holes/
un-even application
of
stains,
^sealers
, and- lacquer/
mis-installed
hardware,
faulty
hinges,
faulty
drawer rollers,
any doors
or drawers
out of
level
or square/
any cabinets
out of level
or
square/
not
anchored
to
wall properly/
any doors
or drawers
not operating
smoothly
and
correctly/
etc./
will be considered
a job
un-completed.
Contractor
linoleum,
Contractor
around all

responsible
etc.,
as well
to
provide
upper stage

All upper and
construction,
Contractor
to
on all cabinets
include
details
owner.

for damage
as cabinets
and

install
cabinets.

to paint,
during
crown

lower stage
cabinets
to
with rounded
corners.

wall board,
installation.

molding

include

and dental
raised

panel

doors,
mold
type

provide
owner with three
complete
sets
of drawings
^j
and return
with
signed
agreement.
Drawings
to
of
all
features.
Drawings
to be approved
by

Contractor to use tAe JLatest
state
of the art manufacturing
techniques with a ^high ^regard for quality'control.
Contractor to
use the highest quality materials
available*
7? Contractor is a licensed
contractor,
and liable for any necessary
permits
and
licenses
required
to work in Summit County.
Contractor to be fully insured
and carry
Utm-h^State Workman's
Compensation Insurance.
Owner not responsible
for lost or stolen
tools and or materials.
Owner not responsible
for death or injury
incurred at job by contractor
or his
employees.
Contractors to provide cabinets for entire house^p&r\jtha above but
^Qlimited^*tor??£or
'/the
''amount\ of -*> VfTOO. ° ° '
. Price
*ncludea&r**dray*$e/^^installation;
malm* :ax. - Cabinets v to be
guaranteed for'period
of two-years.
Cabinets to be'of the highest
mtandard-of" quality,
no seconds will* be accepted. Contractor to
Entertain any reasonable requests by owner*
RYL'. Pack agrees to provide payment if full
within
after completion and final inspection
by E.L. Pack
Contractor

(J^^X^/LH^

E.L. Pack ^ T

Qabinets-to

X.

~~
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be delivered

and installed

on:

thirty

days

Date

0-^^W

Date
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STANDARD FORI! QF A6REDOT FOR CABINETS AAO INSTALLATION
ftt»M»: ?c.L - f?rZ
Purchaser
Hoi
« **dTess
/f>4fi f **<* fag
Dfllv

«7

Address^^^UMid^d^2^^^

*** Seller: THE CABINET.SHOPPE P*one- (307)-782-ol2?
M
^»s:
P.O. 8or 137? Lyean, By. 82937
°* !• The seller agrees to furnish the eateriais and services set forth in the drawings (•
description annexed hereto.
, _
.
Coatrzct price
* .KjSfySales tai
*
Total purchase price
* %{<fi)&
^
Schedule of payeent:
'
Upon signing of this agreeeent..*
H Upon pickup/delivery...
%<7\STn.<&~

and dated

) an:

This contract includes the tens and provisions as set forth herein.
Please read and sign where indicated. ,
° * 2. The delivery date, when given, shall be deeied approxiaate and perforiance is subject to delays caused by strikes.
ttrvs, natural disasters, availability of the product at the t u e of delivery.
*K3. The risk of loss, as to daeage or destruction, shall be upon the delivery and receipt of the product. The purchaser
agrees to accept delivery of the product when ready, It Cabinets not picked up after 5 days of coipletion are subject to storage
charges. Cabinets not picked up after 30 days will be sold to recover the balance due.
3*4. The purchaser understands that the products described are specially designed and tustoi built and that the seller takes
need lata steps upon execution of this agreement to design, order and construct those iteis set forth herein; therefore, this
agreeaent is not subject to cancellation by the purchaser for any reason.
« Fee*) 5. No installation, pluabing, electrical, flooring, decorating or other construction work is to be provided unless
specifically set forth.
9* 6. Cabinet area is to be heated; eust be cleared of all debris, painted and all electric and pluabmg. ready before cabinets
are installed. Seller i s not responsible for daeaged products after delivery and,or installation.
° « 7. Delays in payeent shall be subject to a latr charge of 125.00 per eonth. If the seller i s required to engage the
services of a collection agency or an attorney, the purchaser agrees to rexeburse the seller for any reasonable aeounts expended
in order to collect the unpaid balance.
4 «>c«4 8. This agreeeent sets forth the entire transaction between the parties; any and all prior agreeients. eade by either party
are superseded by this agreeeent. All changes in this agreeeent shall be aade by a separate docueent and executed Mith the saae
foraahties.
9. The seller retains the right upon breach of this agreeeent by the purchaser to sell those iteis in the sailer's
possession, in effecting any resale on breach of this agreeeent by the purchaser, the purchaser shall be liable for any net
deficiency on resale.
10. The seller agrees that it will perfora this contract in ccnforeity with custoeary industry practices. The ourchase'agrees that any ciaia rcr adjustaent shall not be reason or cause for failure to eake payeent arising froa or under this
contract shall be* settled by arbitration and jurisd>rt}Qn, the arbitration shall be held utter the rules sf the Aaer-.cr
Arbitration Association.
Accepted:

O.s^^rZkujLj,
Se/ler y
Date < ^ f r ^ y

Accepted:
Purchaser
Oate^-aj>-,pj>
DESCRIPTION ATTACHES
CABINET MARRANTY

THE CABINET 3H0P°E warrants their cabinets against defects in aatenal and wcrraanship for a period :n one year rroi t h e da:2 :•
deii.ery to the original purchaser.
THE CABINET SHQPPE warrants their drawer guides, hinges and adjustable shelf rails for a period of three /ears.
Iaocrtant: This warranty does not cover daiage resulting froe eisuse, abuse, or lack of care to the cabinets. All warrant,
defective parts lust be returned to THE CABINET SHOPPE prepaid./rfhis warranty does not include labor, eileage or i n s t a i l a t i r
charges. T his warranty i s VOID if payaent ; s 30 days past d u e / Y o u eay obtain warranty service by calling THE CABINET SHCP??
(307)

732-6129.

****
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Addendum D

STERLINGWOOD
10/22/88
ED PACK
1830 EAST 9800 SOUTH
SANDY, UTAH 84092
REJ

CABINETS AND INSTALLATION

I HAVE DISCUSSED ALL MATTERS WITH THE STAFF AND AN ATTORNEY.
WE FEEL THAT WE HAVE BEEN MORE THAN GENEROUS IN OUR CONSTRUCTION AND
INSTALLATION OF CABINETRY IN YOUR HOME.
WE AT THE ONSET OF THE
PROJECT ALLOWED YOU TO USE OUR NAME TO BUY WOOD PRODUCTS AT OUR
DISCOUNT PRICE AT YOUR REQUEST.
WE HAVE REMADE CABINETS AT NO
CHARGE TO YOU TO SUIT YOUR WISHES, RATHER THAN LEAVING THEM THE
WAY THAT THEY ARE PRODUCED.
WE INSTALLED YOUR CUSTOM RANGE HOOD USING THI §PI§lF"I§ftTI8N§ THAT
YOU PROVIDED TO US.
AFTER INSTALLATION WE FOUND THAT THE PAPER
THAT YOU GAVE US DID NOT HAVE THE CORRECT MEASUREMENTS.
WE TRIED
TO MAKE THE CUSTOM HOOD WORK BUT YOU WISHED US TO MAKE A NEW HOOD,
WE MADE A NEW HOOD AND REINSTALLED ALONG WITH THE FAN PROVIDED AT
NO EXTRA COST TO YOU. YOU DID NOT PROVIDE US WITH A TRANSITION
PART AT THE TIME OF INSTALLATION AND INSISTED THAT WE SHOULD
PROVIDE ONE.
WE WERE ONLY TO MOUNT SUCH ITEMS PER YOUR
INSTRUCTIONS.
YOU DID NOT WISH TO HAVE YOUR LETTER SLOTS ABOVE YOUR KITCHEN DESK
EXPOSED AFTER THEY WERE INSTALLED.
WE REBUILT THE UPPER CABINET
TO ENCLOSE THE LETTER SLOTS AS YOU WISHED AT NO EXTRA COST TO YOU.
YOU ASKED FOR A DRAWER BANK IN YOUR KITCHEN ISLAND AREA AFTER
INSTALLATION YOU DECIDED YOU NEEDED MORE CABINET SPACE AND DID NOT
WANT A DRAWER BANK AFTER ALL. WE REMOVED TWO CABINETS AND BUILT A
NEW ONE INSTALLED IT AT NO EXTRA COST TO YOU.
YOU WISHED TO HAVE YOUR DIVIDERS ABOVE YOUR REFREGERATOR REMOVABLE
RATHER THAN STATIONARY AS THEY ARE DESIGNED WITH THE TYPE OF TRIM
THAT YOU WANTED.
WE REMADE THE CABINET SO THAT THE DIVIDERS ARE
REMOVABLE AT NO EXTRA COST TO YOU.
WE TRIMED THE OAK COUNTER TOP WITH AN OAK BACKSPLASH AT NO
COST TO YOU.

EXTRA

AS FAR AS OUR (CHEAP TAPE) AS YOU STATED, IT IS NOT CHEAP.
YOU
WILL FIND THE VERY SAME BRAND IN THE MOST EXPENSIVE CABINETRY
RIGHT IN SALT LAKE CITY.
I DID SHOW YOU A SAMPLE OF OUR CABINET USING THE SAME PRODUCT AND
ALSO OFFERED TO SHOW OTHER HOMES WITH OUR CABINETRY, SO TO HAVE NO
DOUBT WHETHER OR NOT YOU WISHED TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE COMPANY.

'ISITED OTHER HOMES IN THE CITATION SUBDIVISION WHERE
OUR
NSTALLER WAS INSTALLING OUR CABINETRY.
THIS YOU DID BEFORE YOUR
lABINETRY WAS STARTED. YOU DID HAVE AMPLE EXPOSURE TO OUR PRODUCT
iND MATERIAL FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.
IUR (FLIMSY) SHELF SUPPORTS AS YOU STATED ARE THE VERY BEST OF
IUALITY STEEL PINS WITH AN OUTER PLASTIC COVER TO BLEND IN THE
,'ABINETRY - THEY ARE EXPENSIVE.
WE ARE ALWAYS HAPPY TO GIVE OUR
IUSTOMERS EXTRA IN CASE OF LOSS NOT BREAKAGE.
BUT YOU DEMAND
.'XTRA AT NO EXTRA COST TO YOU.
'OU COMPLAINED THAT THE GRID IN THE LIGHT FRAME WAS SEPARATED.
"HIS PIECE OF CABINETRY IS GLUED AND SCREWED TOGETHER.
THE ONLY
IAY IT COULD BE SEPARATED WOULD BE FOR SOMEONE TO LEAN ON IT WHILE
NSTALLATION OF THE ELECTICAL WORK. WE DO NOT BREAK THINGS ON THE
OB AND LEAVE THEM AS YOU ACCUSED, SO THAT IT COULD BE REPAIRED AT
10 EXTRA COST TO YOU.
lEATER KICKS WERE CUT PER YOUR INSTRUCTED SIZE WHILE YOU
IOW YOU WISH THEM RECUT AT NO EXTRA COST TO YOU.

WATCHED

IUTOUTS IN THE KITCHEN AND BATH SINK CABINETS WERE CUT PER YOUR
NSTRUCTED SIZE AFTER INSTALLATION YOU WISH TO HAVE THEM RECUT TO
\ LARGER SIZE AT NO EXTRA COST TO YOU.
AZY SUSAN SHELF HEIGHT IS A MATTER OF PREFERENCE!
THEY MAY BE
[AISLY ADJUSTED BY THE CUSTOMER AT ANYTIME TO MEET THEIR NEEDS.
IE DO NOT DELIVER PRODUCTS TO THE JOB SITE BEAT UP AS YOU STATED.
IOW YOU HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT DELAY!
IELIEF DUE YOU!

AND WISH TO

WORK

OUT

IEMOVING,
REBUILDING, REINSTALLING ALL TAKES MORE TIME
JESCEDULING.
WE WORKED YOUR JOB IN OUR SCEDULE AS QUICKLY
[FFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE.

A

FOR
AND

WILL NOT CARRY ON ABOUT COST TO OUR BUSINESS ON THIS PROJECT.
IE HAVE GIVEN YOU MUCH MORE THAN THE INITIAL $8,500 STATED AND PUT
TJRTH IN OUR CONTRACT THAT YOU HAVE SIGNED.
OUR GOAL HAS BEEN TO
IOMPLETE THE PROJECT AT YOUR SATISFACTION.
HE TRIM WEST WALL, TRIM OVER DESK, SHELVES, DRAWERS TO BE
ADJUSTED AND FILE DRAWER - THESE ARE THINGS WE ARE HAPPY TO TAKE
.'ARE OF.
PLEASE CONTACT MARK THE INSTALLER AT THE SHOP TO MAKE AN
APPOINTMENT TO MEET AT YOUR HOME SO HE MAY COMPLETE THESE ITEMS
iHILE YOU ARE PRESENT.
HE WILL EXPECT A CASHIERS CHECK AT THAT
"IME FOR THE TOTAL AMOUNT DUE $5,025.
N CLOSING, IT IS WITH REGRET THAT I SHOULD HAVE TO WRITE SUCH A
.ETTER AT ALL. I DO NOT FEEL THAT YOU HAVE A REASON TO PROTEST
"HE QUALITY OF CABINETRY OR THE CONCIENCE EFFORT ON OUR PART TO

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO YOUR FEELINGS IN THIS MATTER I INCLOSE MY
BILLING AGAIN TO YOU AND REFER YOU TO THE CONTRACT THAT YOU SIGNED
THAT STATES PAYMENT UPON DELIVERY, PLEASE REFER TO YOUR COPY OF
YOUR CONTRACT.
RESPECTFULLY,

JEAN LEWIS, SALES - PER YOUR CONTRACT

